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Traditional theories of cognitive science have typically accounted for the organization
of human behavior by detailing requisite computational/representational functions and
identifying neurological mechanisms that might perform these functions. Put simply,
such approaches hold that neural activity causes behavior. This same general framework
has been extended to accounts of human social behavior via concepts such as
“common-coding” and “co-representation” and much recent neurological research has
been devoted to brain structures that might execute these social-cognitive functions.
Although these neural processes are unquestionably involved in the organization and
control of human social interactions, there is good reason to question whether they
should be accorded explanatory primacy. Alternatively, we propose that a full appreciation
of the role of neural processes in social interactions requires appropriately situating
them in their context of embodied-embedded constraints. To this end, we introduce
concepts from dynamical systems theory and review research demonstrating that the
organization of human behavior, including social behavior, can be accounted for in terms of
self-organizing processes and lawful dynamics of animal-environment systems. Ultimately,
we hope that these alternative concepts can complement the recent advances in cognitive
neuroscience and thereby provide opportunities to develop a complete and coherent
account of human social interaction.
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INTRODUCTION
To note that human beings are “social creatures” is to risk mak-
ing a dramatic understatement. Consider examples of everyday
behavior in which individuals appear to be acting entirely on their
own. Consider sitting at an intersection while waiting for the light
to change. Although you are alone in the car, as evidenced by
your singing along to the radio, in some real sense this is “social
behavior.” In obeying the rules of the road, and stopping at the
light when it is red, your behavior is organized by social conven-
tion. In singing along to the radio, you engage in a behavior of
immense social significance with roots in thousands of years of
cultural tradition. That our natural behaviors are so deeply about
the behavior of other human beings makes considerable demands
on theories of social interaction.
The past 20 years of cognitive neuroscience has met these
demands with research on neurological structures proposed as
mechanisms serving the many functions of social cognition and
joint action (Gallese, 2003; Newman-Norland et al., 2007; Graf
et al., 2009). The activity of such neural networks, most notably
mirror neuron systems (Gallese et al., 1996; Iacoboni et al.,
1999; see Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004, for review), have been
implicated across the full range of social phenomena, from coor-
dinated spatio-temporal interactions (e.g., imitation; Iacoboni,
2005) to the ability to understand one another’s cognitive and
emotional states (e.g., empathy; Gallese, 2001). Although these
neural structures are unquestionably part of a complete account,
basing a theory of human behavior solely on neural pro-
cesses, to the exclusion of all others, implicitly assumes a causal
primacy.
In line with the focus of this special issue, online and real-
time social interactions involve a host of processes that serve as
important constraints in shaping and organizing social behav-
ior and cognition. In this paper, we introduce a set of concepts
from dynamical systems theory (e.g., Kugler and Turvey, 1987;
Saltzman and Kelso, 1987; Turvey, 1990; Kelso, 1995; Warren,
2006) that provide a means for capturing how organized behav-
ior emerges, or “self-organizes,” from these rich contexts of
constraint. To detail how these concepts might apply to social
interactions, we explore interpersonal rhythmic coordination
as an example of self-organization in joint action (see Marsh
et al., 2006, 2009; Richardson et al., 2008, 2010; Schmidt and
Richardson, 2008 for more detailed reviews). Consistent with the
embodied-embedded perspective (e.g., Brooks, 1991; Clark, 1998;
van Dijk et al., 2008), we argue for a theory of social interac-
tion that situates the activity of neural structures in a context of
continuous interaction with a myriad of other natural processes.
Ultimately, we hope that this set of alternative concepts can serve
as a complementary framework (see Kelso and Enstrøm, 2006) to
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traditional theories and advance the development of a complete
and coherent account of human behavior and mind.
SOCIAL NEUROMECHANICS
The field of cognitive science has customarily explained human
behavior as the output of a computational system. Generally,
these theories contend that behavior is organized and controlled
via cognitive processes manifest in the activities of the central
nervous system, which form representations of the environment
from incoming sensory stimulation, and plan actions in accor-
dance with these representations (e.g., von Eckardt, 1993; Kawato,
1999). In short, neural mechanisms are the crucial causal link
between the organism and its environment. The same explanatory
principles are applied in theories of social behavior. Functions
necessary for social interaction, such as predicting the actions of
co-actors, are met with representational mechanisms carried out
in neural processing (e.g., Hommel et al., 2001; Blakemore and
Frith, 2005; Sebanz and Knoblich, 2009).
Research in support of these principles has produced an abun-
dance of information detailing neurological mechanisms that
might support such representational processes. Comprehensive
review of this literature is beyond the scope of this article, and has
already been provided elsewhere (e.g., Rizzolatti and Craighero,
2004; Newman-Norland et al., 2007; Graf et al., 2009). The
forthcoming argument concerning the nature of these neural pro-
cesses, however, requires at a minimum an appreciation of the
basic findings underlying concepts such as “common-coding”
and “co-representation.”
Converging evidence supports that several structures across
the human brain comprise a network which underlies social func-
tions (Grafton and Hamilton, 2007; Newman-Norland et al.,
2007; Bekkering et al., 2009). For instance, several studies have
supported the involvement of the superior temporal sulcus (STS)
in the perception of biological motion and goal-directed move-
ments (e.g., Grossman and Blake, 2000; Puce and Perrett, 2003;
Schultz et al., 2004). Specifically, increased activity in the STS
has been associated with point-light displays of goal-directed or
biological movements as contrasted against random point-light
movements (Bonda et al., 1996; Grossman and Blake, 2000).
Interestingly, the STS shows increased activity not only with stim-
uli depicting human movement, but also with stimuli depicting
non-human objects that appear to reflect animate movement
(Blakemore et al., 2003; Schultz et al., 2004). For instance, Schultz
et al. (2005) manipulated the degree to which the movements of
geometrical shapes were correlated with one another, and found
that increases in this “interactivity parameter” were met with
greater ratings of animacy and increased activity in the STS.
Thus, the function of the STS (i.e., detection of goal-directed
movement) is argued to underlie the acquisition of informa-
tion critical to sustaining social interactions (Puce and Perrett,
2003).
Although social interactions doubtlessly involve the STS, it
was the discovery of neural structures involved in both the
perception and production of goal-directed actions that trans-
formed neurological accounts of joint action (for reviews see
Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010).
Briefly, these “mirror neurons” were originally discovered in the
premotor cortex of macaque monkeys when cells became active
during both execution and observation of object-directed actions
(di Pellegrino et al., 1992). Subsequent research has detailed the
different actions coded by these neurons (e.g., power vs. precision
grips) and revealed the extent to which these neurons were “con-
gruent,” requiring an exact match between observed and executed
action (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996a).
Structures with similar mirror properties have been discov-
ered in the human brain (Fadiga et al., 1995; Rizzolatti et al.,
1996b; Iacoboni et al., 1999; Decety et al., 2002). The human
mirror system is a more complex network with areas displaying
mirror properties in both frontal and parietal regions (Rizzolatti
and Craighero, 2004). Whereas the frontal regions are involved in
coding for the goal of the action, the parietal regions are involved
in coding for the kinematics of the movement (Iacoboni et al.,
1999). Subsequent research yielded a number of interesting facts
about the mirror system and extended its functional properties
to accounts of imitation (Iacoboni, 2005), complementary joint
action (Newman-Norland et al., 2007), empathy (Gallese, 2001),
and deficits associated with autism spectrum disorder (Sebanz
et al., 2005).
The discovery of the mirror system fit nicely with concurrent
theoretical work proposing that action observation and execu-
tion share a common representational domain (Prinz, 1990, 1997;
Hommel et al., 2001). That is, via activation of mirror systems,
observation of a co-actor’s behavior engages the same representa-
tional structures necessary to produce similar or complementary
behaviors. This “common-coding” (i.e., representational equiva-
lence) between action observation and execution constitutes an
inherent linkage between co-actors during social interactions.
Hence, these neural structures are considered the mechanism
supporting covert motor simulations (Graf et al., 2009), allowing
co-actors to “co-represent” a common task, infer, and understand
the action goals of their partners, predict future behaviors, and
establish coordination during joint actions (Knoblich and Sebanz,
2006; Sebanz and Knoblich, 2009).
Although it remains unclear as to how mirror systems per-
form these social-cognitive functions, several plausible models
are possible. For instance, Kilner and colleagues (2007a) pro-
pose that the human mirror system, including the STS and both
parietal and frontal mirror neuron centers, comprises a represen-
tational hierarchy capable of processing equivalent to empirical
Bayesian inference. This account suggests reciprocal couplings
between levels of the hierarchy, which represent kinematics of the
observed movement (STS), motor commands which gave rise to
the observed movements (parietal mirror neurons), and action
goals which gave rise to those motor commands (frontal mirror
neurons), respectively. Generative processing gives rise to predic-
tions of motor commands given a goal, and likewise, predictions
of observed kinematics given motor commands. Whereas back-
ward connections convey predictions from higher to lower levels,
forward connections convey errors in prediction from lower
to higher levels. Predicted kinematics can be compared to the
observed kinematics and the error in prediction can then be used
to adjust higher-level representations. By minimizing error across
this reciprocal processing, an observer can, therefore, derive the
most likely goal of an observed action.
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In addition to support from neuroscience, a number of behav-
ioral studies have also yielded evidence consistent with common-
coding theories of joint action (Brass et al., 2001; Kilner et al.,
2003, 2007b; Sebanz et al., 2003, 2005; Vogt et al., 2003; Press
et al., 2005; Stanley et al., 2007). Generally, these studies reveal
action-observation effects in which the observation of a co-actor’s
behaviors, or knowledge of the co-actors task, affects the produc-
tion of one’s own action. For instance, Press et al. (2005) had
participants produce a hand-opening gesture in response to a
visual stimulus. They found slower reaction times when the stim-
uli depicted a hand in an incongruent configuration (i.e., closed)
than in a congruent configuration (i.e., open). These data are con-
sistent with a common-coding account in that the observation
of an incongruent behavior (i.e., a closed hand) activates repre-
sentations that conflict with the motor commands planned for
execution (i.e., opening the hand). The resolution of this conflict
is expressed in longer reaction times.
In a similar example with later relevance, Kilner et al. (2003,
also see Stanley et al., 2007) had participants produce rhythmic
armmovements in the horizontal plane while watching the move-
ments of a confederate. Participants produced greater variability
in the uninstructed plane of their movements (i.e., more verti-
cal movement variability) when confederate movements were in
the incongruent plane (i.e., vertical movements of the confed-
erate). Again, these “motor contagion” effects (Blakemore and
Frith, 2005) are consistent with the theory of common-coding
and the known properties of mirror systems.
This evidence from both neurological and behavioral research
has garnered widespread support for a “neuromechanistic”
account of social behavior (but see Jacob and Jeannerod, 2005;
Dinstein et al., 2008; Hickok, 2009). In summary, this account
holds that the activity of specific neural structures constitutes
the causal organization of social interactions. To be sure, evi-
dence in favor of an inherently social brain has considerably
advanced scientific accounts of the inherently social nature of
human mind and behavior. Without doubting the validity of the
scientific findings offered in support of this account, there is rea-
son to question whether a theory of social interaction should
rely on these neural processes exclusively. Exclusive explanatory
recourse to the activity of neural structures fails to appreci-
ate the complete behavioral contexts in which these structures
have emerged and in which they perform their functions. We
contend that contextualizing these neural processes in the full
set of embodied-embedded constraints on behavior will pro-
vide the basis for a grounded understanding of human social
interaction.
In what follows we synthesize an argument made across
several recent works (Marsh et al., 2009a; Richardson et al.,
2010; Schmidt et al., 2011) that supports an alternative set
of explanatory principles in approaching the organization of
human behavior. Specifically, we argue that applying concepts
from the dynamical systems framework (e.g., Kugler and Turvey,
1987; Kelso, 1995; Strogatz, 2003; Warren, 2006) to a theory
of social interaction offers an opportunity to appropriately sit-
uate the activities of the nervous system in the context of a
complete social system. Ultimately, we hope that these alterna-
tive theoretical principles can complement the recent advances
in social-cognitive neuroscience, and thus provide new windows
into understanding human social behavior.
DYNAMICS IN ACTION
Juarrero (2000) begins her treatment of human behavior with a
consideration of concepts of causality. She notes that the approach
favored in traditional cognitive science has addressed the organi-
zation of behavior with the Newtonian notion of efficient (i.e.,
billiard-ball) causality to the exclusion of other conceptualiza-
tions of causal relationships (e.g., Aristotle’s final, formal, and
material causes). An exclusive reliance on efficient causality is
reflected in an exclusive recourse to the causal powers of compo-
nential functions (i.e., neural mechanisms) to explain the order of
behavioral states (e.g., walking, talking, playing chess). Although
the notion of efficient cause-and-effect is a powerful explana-
tory tool, and necessarily part of any complete account, staunch
reliance on efficient causality alone underlies many of the the-
oretical and philosophical issues associated with computational
accounts to human behavior (e.g., Turvey and Shaw, 1979; Searle,
1980; Jordan, 1998; Juarrero, 2000).
The explanatory framework promoted by the dynamical sys-
tems approach operates under an alternative conceptualization
of causality. Behavior is not understood as the “output” of effi-
cient, mechanistic operations on “inputs.” Rather, behavior is said
to self-organize across reciprocal relations between local compo-
nential interactions and the global behavioral state of the system
(Haken, 1977/1983; Kugler et al., 1980; Kugler and Turvey, 1987;
Thelen and Smith, 1994; Kelso, 1995; Strogatz, 2003; van Orden
et al., 2003). The term self-organization is used to refer to patterns
of behavioral order that emerge naturally from the free inter-
play of forces and mutual influences between components. That
is, behavior is considered an emergent pattern that results from
the balance of constraints that coordinate interactions of the sys-
tems components. Such patterns, and the nature of constraints
that give rise to them, can be understood by studying the system’s
dynamics, or the lawful evolution of the system’s behavior.
An introduction to these concepts is perhaps best accom-
plished through a well-known example of self-organization in a
simple physical system, such as the Rayleigh–Benard instability
(e.g., Kelso, 1995; van Orden et al., 2003). In this phenomenon a
relatively thin layer of oil in a pan is heated from below. Applying
heat from below creates a temperature differential between the
hot oil at the bottom of the pan and the cool oil at the top. Within
a range of temperature gradients, random collisions between the
individual molecules of oil are sufficient to transfer the energy
from the source of the heat at the bottom of the pan to the
oil’s surface where it can be dispersed. As the heat from below
is increased, however, random collisions between the molecules
no longer suffice to dispense the incoming energy. Past a certain
critical point random motion of the oil molecules gives way to
orderly “convection rolls”; currents that move the molecules from
the bottom of the pan to the surface with adjacent rolls turning in
opposite directions (i.e., clockwise vs. counter-clockwise).
Again, dynamical systems theory attempts to account for how
behavior emerges as a result of coupling enforced on compo-
nential interactions by relevant constraints. In the example, the
system components (i.e., oil molecules) are coordinated into a
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collective, orderly behavior (i.e., convection rolls) in accordance
with thermodynamic constraints (i.e., properties affecting energy
dissipation). All factors that affect the temperature gradient (e.g.,
viscosity of the oil, size of the pan, degree of heat applied) can be
said to constrain system behavior. For instance, a given degree of
heat applied might, or might not, be sufficient to produce con-
vection roll behavior dependent on the viscosity of the oil, the
size of the pan, or the coolness of the air above the pan. Thus, the
balance of the relevant constraints determines which behavioral
state the system will adopt (e.g., random motion vs. convection
rolls), and manipulations of these constraints (e.g., changing the
temperature differential) drive the system through its behavioral
states.
To be clear, the dynamical systems approach does not assert
that mechanical, efficient causal processes are inconsequential
to an account of system behavior. Convection roll behavior cer-
tainly could not exist without physical interaction between oil
molecules. What this approach contends is that efficient causal
interactions between components are themselves subject to the
constraints imposed at the level of the complete system. That is,
global behavioral regularities are understood as the expression
of interaction-dominants dynamics (see van Orden et al., 2003).
Unlike a truly mechanical, component-dominant system (e.g.,
watch, engine, computer), in which behavior is the final out-
put of efficient causal links between functionally independent
mechanisms, an interaction-dominant system entails a func-
tional interdependence between components. The activity of each
component is dependent on the activity of the coupled com-
ponents. Thus, the interaction itself is critical to an account of
the observed behavior. Physical interactions of the oil molecules
are constrained to a collective, synergetic structure by the ther-
modynamic forces imposed in the experimental preparation. It
is in this sense that behavior is self-organized. Global behavioral
order is the result of a dynamical balance between lawful pro-
cesses that coordinate componential relationships. Accordingly,
the dynamical systems approach aims to capture behavioral regu-
larities at the level of the complete system and to understand how
those behavioral regularities emerge, are sustained, and eventually
destroyed, in the terms of interaction-dominant dynamics (e.g.,
van Orden et al., 2003; Kello et al., 2007; Kello and van Orden,
2009; Anderson et al., in press).
These theoretical aspirations are no different in the case of
human behaviors; provide an account of how system components
(e.g., limbs, dance partners, societies) are coupled to produce
states of behavioral regularity (e.g., walking, waltzing, warring).
Central to this account of human behavior is the concept of
synergies or coordinative structures (e.g., Bernstein, 1967; Turvey
et al., 1978; Kelso, 1984). A synergy is a temporarily assembled,
task-specific, functional coupling between a system’s componen-
tial degrees-of-freedom (see Kelso, 2009). Conceptually similar to
the example of the convection roll behavior, the system’s com-
ponents are coupled such that they behave as a complete func-
tional unit by virtue of the constraints inherent in the behavioral
task. Just as oil molecules self-organize into convection rolls in
accordance with thermodynamic constraints, the componential
degrees-of-freedom of the human motor system (e.g., neurons,
muscles, limbs) self-organize into synergetic units in accordance
with the constraints imposed in the animal-environment rela-
tionship.
The concept of synergies has been thoroughly applied in the
domain of motor control as a potential resolution to the need to
coordinate a multiple-effector body in a complex environment to
realize behavioral goals. For instance, Saltzman and Kelso (1987)
state that motor degrees-of-freedom are coordinated to behave as
synergies by the dynamical constraints of a given task. Organizing
the motor system into synergetic structures greatly simplifies the
problems of motor control. Once coordinated to behave as a func-
tional unit, the individual degrees-of-freedom do not need to
be controlled independently of one another, and perturbations
applied to a component are automatically compensated by the
coupled components (e.g., Kelso, 1984; Latash et al., 2002; Riley
et al., 2011). Although the details are too involved for full review
here, this kind of task-dynamic understanding also enables one to
model how the motor system is organized into synergistic struc-
tures specifically tailored to the dynamics of a given task, such as
reaching to grasp a cup and returning the cup to the mouth to
drink (Saltzman and Kelso, 1987).
More recently, Warren (2006) has proposed an extension of
these principles to explain how animals might control their
relationship to their environment via perceptual information.
Warren argues that the animal and the environment should be
understood as componential systems and that the animal and
the environment together comprise a behavioral synergy when
coupled to one another through mechanical and informational
constraints inherent in the particular task. That is, the rela-
tively high-dimensional interactions that exist between an animal
and its environment underlie the emergence of a relatively low-
dimensional behavior. Under this conception, agents accomplish
behavioral goals by learning the control laws that map physical
forces and perceptual information to the dynamics of the action
system. Accordingly, the adaptive human behavior can be mod-
eled as emerging from the lawful interactions between perceptual
and motor variables by using low-dimensional dynamical mod-
els (i.e., differential equations). For example, Warren and Fajen
(2003, 2008) demonstrated how goal-directed paths of locomo-
tion can emerge from properties of a person’s action system and
his or her surrounding environment. Using elementary dynami-
cal components, such as dynamical (point) attractors to explain
the paths toward a target and dynamical repellers to explain paths
of obstacle avoidance, they modeled the self-organized emergence
of rather complex aspects of locomotion, such as route selection
and route switching.
Thus, these general explanatory principles of self-organization
and emergence have been extended from dynamical systems the-
ory and instantiated in several theories of human behavior, such
as coordination dynamics (Kelso, 1995) and behavioral dynam-
ics (Warren, 2006). Given the promising application of these
theoretical principles to understanding how individual actors
coordinate and control their behavior in their environments, sev-
eral researchers have recently argued for a dynamical approach to
human social behavior (Marsh et al., 2009; Schmidt et al., 2011).
Although there is not yet a general dynamical theory of social
behavior, the study of coordination dynamics (i.e., spatio-temporal
entrainment) has provided a particularly interesting example of
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self-organizing processes in human social interaction in the case
of interpersonal rhythmic coordination (e.g., Kelso, 1995; Marsh
et al., 2006; Schmidt and Richardson, 2008).
DYNAMICS IN JOINT ACTION
Rhythmic coordination is a foundational aspect of behavior for
organisms that propel themselves through their respective envi-
ronments. von Holst (1937/1973) described the coordination
between the fins of his Labrus fish with concepts such as “main-
tenance tendency” and “magnet effect” (see Amazeen et al.,
1995). He observed that the patterns of coordination between fins
seemed to be the result of a dynamic balance between “compe-
tition” (i.e., each fin maintains its own intrinsic frequency) and
“cooperation” (i.e., fins move together). Later research by Kelso
and his colleagues (Kelso, 1981, 1984; Haken et al., 1985; see
Kelso, 1995) demonstrated that similar intrapersonal rhythmic
limb coordination in humans could be explained using dynam-
ical systems principles (for review, see Schmidt and Richardson,
2008).
Specifically, Kelso’s (1981, 1984) experiments demonstrated
that participants naturally produced only two forms of biman-
ual rhythmic coordination. In “inphase” coordination, the limbs
were synchronized as they went through their respective oscil-
latory cycles. In the case of finger movements, this mode corre-
sponds to when each finger reached the top of its swing upward,
and the bottom of its swing downward, at the same time. In
“antiphase” coordination, the limbs were offset from one another
by a half-cycle (i.e., one finger up and one finger down simul-
taneously). Interestingly, inphase coordination is more stable
(i.e., less variable) than antiphase coordination, and thus, can
be performed across a broader range of frequencies. Indeed,
participants instructed to produce antiphase coordination spon-
taneously transitioned to the inphase mode at faster movement
frequencies (irrespective of movement frequency the opposite
transition does not occur, people do not transition from inphase
to antiphase coordination; see Schmidt and Richardson, 2008).
Most interestingly, Haken et al. (1985) demonstrated that mod-
eling “relative phase” as the collective variable for a system of
coupled oscillators could capture these coordination dynamics in
a simple and elegant manner.
Foregoing a complete technical description (see Pikovsky et al.,
2001), the movement of an oscillatory limb at any point in its
cycle can be described using the “phase angle” (θ) of its circular
trajectory on the position-by-velocity phase space (see Figure 1).
That is, the beginning of each rhythmic cycle (θ = 0◦) corre-
sponds to the limb being at a maximal, end-point position (e.g.,
finger completely up), but with zero velocity (e.g., no longer mov-
ing upward, and yet to move downward). As the limb moves
through its rhythmic cycle, it speeds up and slows down to reach
its opposite end-point position (e.g., finger completely down)
which corresponds to the half-cycle (i.e., θ = 180◦). The limb
again speeds up and slows down, now in the opposite direction,
to return to its starting position (i.e., θ = 360◦/0◦).
Thus, the “relative phase angle” (φ), which is simply the dif-
ference between the phase angle of two oscillators (φ = θ1 − θ2),
captures the collective behavioral state of the system of coupled
oscillators. Two oscillators coordinated in the inphase mode will
be at the same phase angle of their respective cycles at the same
time, and thus, the relative phase over time will be zero (i.e.,
φ = 0◦). Oscillators coordinated in the antiphase mode will be in
opposite phase angle of their respective cycles over time, and thus,
the relative phase will be offset by a half-cycle (i.e., φ = 180◦).
Kelso and colleagues (1990) extended the earliermodel (Haken
et al., 1985) in order to model relative phase dynamics as a
function of two terms with striking similarity to von Holst’s
conception: the degree of coupling between the two oscillatory
components (i.e., magnet effect) and the difference in the inher-
ent frequency of each component (i.e., maintenance tendency).
φ˙ = ω− a sinφ− 2b sin2φ (1)
This model Equation 1 captures the “competition” in the
detuning term (ω) as the simple difference in the intrinsic
frequency of each oscillator (ω = ω1 − ω2), while the “coop-
eration” between the two oscillators is captured by the sine
functions (−a sinφ− 2b sin2φ), with coupling strength indexed
by b/a. The relative balance of these two constraints affects
the system dynamics (see Schmidt and Richardson, 2008, for
details).
In the language of synergetics (Haken, 1977/1983; see Schöner
and Kelso, 1988), this model captures the lawful change in the
collective state of the system, or “order parameter,” as a func-
tion of the systems relevant constraints, or “control parameters.”
Manipulating either of the control parameters (i.e., coupling and
detuning) gives rise to predictable changes in the dynamics of the
order parameter (i.e., relative phase). Holding the coupling con-
stant and varying the detuning term produces a “phase lag” in
which the oscillator with the slower natural frequency lags slightly
behind the other. Holding the detuning constant and varying
the coupling affects the relative stability of the attractor states.
At lower levels of coupling the antiphase attractor state becomes
unstable, and only the inphase attractor remains.
The coordination dynamics proscribed by this model fit well
with empirical observations of intrapersonal bimanual coordina-
tion (see Kelso, 1995). With respect to social behavior, research
has provided ample evidence that the same coordination dynam-
ics govern rhythmic behaviors between individuals (Schmidt
et al., 1990, 1998; Amazeen et al., 1995; Richardson et al., 2007).
Pairs of participants intentionally coordinating rhythmic limb
movements are naturally constrained (i.e., without practice) to
the inphase and antiphase modes, and exhibit the same rela-
tive stabilities as in intrapersonal coordination (Schmidt et al.,
1990, 1998; Schmidt and Turvey, 1994). Moreover, research has
demonstrated that experimental manipulations of the detuning
and coupling parameters yield results consistent with Equation 1.
(e.g., Schmidt and Turvey, 1994; Amazeen et al., 1995; Richardson
et al., 2007). For instance, having participants swing pendulums
with different natural frequencies produces the expected phase lag
in the relative phase between participants (Amazeen et al., 1995).
Similarly, manipulations of the strength of visual coupling, such
as decreasing attention (Temprado and Laurent, 2004), the degree
of visual tracking (Schmidt et al., 2007), or the amplitude of the
observedmovement (Varlet et al., in press), all reduce the stability
of coordination.
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Rhythmic pendulum swinging expressed in phase angle
and represented as a position time-series and a position-by-velocity
phase space. (B) Inphase interpersonal coordination expressed in
relative phase angle and represented as a time-series and a phase
pace. (C) Antiphase interpersonal coordination expressed in relative phase
angle.
The same coordination dynamics are evident even in sponta-
neous (i.e., uninstructed) coordination between interacting indi-
viduals (e.g., Schmidt and O’Brien, 1997; Richardson et al., 2005,
2007; Oullier et al., 2008), and between an individual and an
environmental stimulus (Schmidt et al., 2007; Lopresti-Goodman
et al., 2008). For instance, Richardson et al. (2005) found that the
same inphase/antiphase dynamic occurred between two people
who were engaged in an interpersonal task, but not instructed
to coordinate their movements. As in intentionally produced
coordination, increasing the degree of visual coupling between
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participants is met with a predicted increase in coordination sta-
bility (Richardson et al., 2007). Additionally, these same dynamics
appear to govern simultaneous states of coordination at interper-
sonal and intrapersonal scales of rhythmic activity (Coey et al.,
2011). In a compelling example of synergetic coupling at the
interpersonal scale, Harrison and Richardson (2009) have shown
that pairs of participants can be coordinated to behave as single
functional unit by virtue of simple mechanical constraints. In this
study, participants walked and jogged while joined together (one
behind the other) via a foam appendage. The leg movements of
the pairs not only spontaneously became coordinated, but also
exhibited a distinct preference for certain quadrapedal gait pat-
terns (i.e., pace, trot), with differences in gait preference being a
function of the differences in gait stability.
Research also suggests that these coordination dynamics might
be applicable to the motor contagion effects mentioned previ-
ously. Recall, Kilner et al. (2003) found increased variability in the
non-dominant plane of movement when participants observed
a movement in the incongruent direction (e.g., swinging arm
horizontally, confederate oscillating vertically). This additional
movement in the uninstructed plane was interpreted as error
induced in an executed motor commands brought on by obser-
vation of the incongruent movement. Alternatively, Richardson
and colleagues (2009) demonstrated that the additional move-
ment in the uninstructed plane is in fact rhythmically coordinated
with the movements of the observed confederate. Rather than
being extraneous and random “error,” the movements in the
non-instructed plane contained coherent oscillations that were
coordinated with the observed movement. Thus, these results
suggest that this “interference” effect is best understood as the
result of observers recruiting all available degrees-of-freedom
(e.g., up-down movements) to successfully achieve the task goal
and stabilize coordination with the observed movements.
Researchhasalsodemonstrated that thesecoordinationdynam-
ics are linked to other, higher-order aspects of human social
interactions, such as rapport and social connectedness (e.g., Hove
and Risen, 2009; Miles et al., 2009; Paladino et al., 2010; Miles
et al., 2010a). For instance, Miles and colleagues (2009) found
greater third-party ratings of rapport for stimuli depicting the
naturally stable modes (i.e., inphase and antiphase) as compared
to other coordination patterns. More recently, Miles et al. (2011)
employed a minimal-group manipulation and found increased
spontaneous coordination when participants observed the rhyth-
mic movements of a confederate who was labeled as an out-group
member. Furthermore, several studies have demonstrated that
rhythmic coordination dynamics might also differ in conditions
marked by social dysfunction (i.e., autism, Marsh et al., 2009;
Isenhower et al., 2012; schizophrenia, Varlet et al., 2012).
At first blush, the finding that rhythmic coordination dynam-
ics are the same between co-actors as they are within an individ-
ual actor might not seem to make an overwhelming contribu-
tion toward resolving the questions of modern social-cognitive
neuroscience (Sebanz and Knoblich, 2009). Whereas the tradi-
tional questions concern how we might understand one another’s
goals and predict one another’s future behaviors, these data
seem to only speak to joint actions at the most base spatio-
temporal level. Furthermore, a representational account of such
coordination, based in cognitive timing simulations, is cer-
tainly not unthinkable (e.g., Semjen and Ivry, 2001; Ivry and
Richardson, 2002), and arguably could even be based in the
activity of mirror neuron systems (Sebanz and Knoblich, 2009).
What the study of coordination dynamics has provided, how-
ever, is considerable evidence that certain aspects of social inter-
actions can be addressed in the language of self-organizing,
dynamical processes. In brief, what matters for the organization
of rhythmic interpersonal coordination is a coupling between two
oscillatory components strong enough to overcome intrinsic dif-
ferences (i.e., different natural frequencies). This coupling can be
realized across neuromuscular linkages within a person (Kelso,
1984; Haken et al., 1985) or via informational linkages (i.e., visual,
auditory, or haptic couplings) between two people (Schmidt et al.,
1990; Repp and Penel, 2004; Lagarde and Kelso, 2006; Richardson
et al., 2007; Harrison and Richardson, 2009; van der Wel et al.,
2011). Thus, the findings of coordination dynamics research sup-
port the larger theoretical conclusion that behavioral regularity
in joint actions can be understood as an emergent property of
the lawful constraints that bind co-actors to behave as a unified,
functional whole.
DYNAMICS IN DYNAMICS
As mentioned at the outset of this article, the challenge to a
theory of social interaction is the inherent “interrelatedness” of
human behavior. As detailed above, the traditional explanatory
framework in cognitive science has been extended to social inter-
action through inherently social neural structures (i.e., mirror
neuron systems) and the effects these structures have on behavior
(i.e., motor contagion). The evidence in favor of this represen-
tational account makes a persuasive case that these neurological
mechanisms play a foundational role in supporting the cogni-
tive functions necessary to sustain social interactions. In contrast,
the dynamical approach has applied an alternative set of explana-
tory concepts to the understanding of joint action. As evidenced
in the example of interpersonal rhythmic coordination, this gen-
eral framework suggests that the behavioral regularities of joint
actions can be understood as the result of synergetic coupling
between co-actors enforced via mechanical and informational
task constraints. Rather than assert theoretical superiority for
either of these accounts, we hope to open a dialogue as to
how these two frameworks might complement and inform one
another. In line with the focus of this special issue, we begin this
dialogue by suggesting that situating the activity of a social brain
in the constraints inherent in real-time and online social interac-
tions is necessary for a full appreciation of the nervous system’s
role in the organization of social behavior and cognition.
Consistent with the embodied-embedded perspective (e.g.,
Brooks, 1991; Beer, 1995; Hutchins, 1995; Clark, 1998; Gibbs,
2006), this proposal simply asserts that the constraints provided
in the fact that social interactions exist between agents manifest
in physical bodies and within a physical environment is critical
to grounding social cognition. A common criticism of represen-
tational theories of human behavior is that they involve a “loan
of intelligence” (e.g., Dennett, 1978; Turvey et al., 1981; Jordan,
1998). This framework likens the operation of the central ner-
vous system to a computational machine (e.g., von Eckardt, 1993;
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Kawato, 1999); hence “representational mechanisms.” Although
the efficient causal linkages from neural component to neural
component may explain how sensory signals might be mecha-
nistically processed to produce action commands, the claim that
these processes are “understood” or “interpreted” by the agent
leaves looming conceptual issues (Searle, 1980; Chalmers, 1996;
Jordan, 1998). How is it that these physical brain processes can
generate an experience of meaning? How can these meaningful
experiences cause changes in physical processes to enact inten-
tional behavior? Although the neural processes carried out by
networks such as mirror systems are undoubtedly meaningfully
tied to social behavior, the conceptual problem is the same for
the representational account of social cognition. For instance,
the predictive coding account (Kilner et al., 2007a) discussed
previously details the efficient causal mechanism by which an
observed behavior might be contrasted against a predictive model
in order to reduce error in prediction. Although this account is
perfectly sound in terms of the mechanistic processing it pro-
poses, the question as to how an actor arrives at an understanding
of co-actors goals remains unanswered.
We propose that theories of social interaction can begin to
approach a solution to these conceptual issues by complement-
ing the traditional account with the concepts of the dynamical
systems approach, such as self-organization and interaction-
dominant dynamics. To be certain, this proposal is neither
meant to stand “against” the representational or neuro-cognitive
approach, nor do we mean to imply that the questions tradi-
tionally addressed by cognitive research (e.g., thoughts, goals,
intentions) are irrelevant to an account of social behavior. In
the example of interpersonal rhythmic coordination, although
the interacting participants achieve coordination via informa-
tional couplings, it is equally true that this coordination must
be manifest in systems capable of detecting, and thereby cou-
pling through, said perceptual information (Schmidt et al., 2011).
Moreover, the participants’ intentional states are equally impor-
tant (Kloos and van Orden, 2010). An uncooperative participant,
who chooses to attend to the geometrical patterns of the car-
pet rather than the movement patterns of their co-actor, will not
yield rhythmic coordination. Thus, the conceptual approach pro-
posed here is not intended to circumvent the importance of either
neural structures or cognitive processes. What we do contend,
however, is that social-cognitive processes, and the neural pro-
cesses thought to underlie them, only gain full meaning when
appropriately contextualized in the myriad of natural processes
in which they have evolved and in which they are sustained.
As implied by the term “dynamics,” the explanatory goal of
dynamical systems approach is to describe the necessary rela-
tionship (i.e., law) that dictates how the collective state of a
system will change given the constraints imposed on its behav-
ior. In the example of rhythmic coordination, the dynamical
approach captures lawful behavioral regularity that generalizes
across systems with radically different mechanical configurations.
The same coordination dynamics are evident in systems com-
prised of a single human nervous system (i.e., intrapersonal
coordination), multiple human nervous systems (i.e., interper-
sonal coordination), multiple “diminished” nervous systems (e.g.,
fireflies, Hanson, 1978; crickets, Walker, 1969), and no nervous
systems at all (e.g., pendulum clocks, Huygens, 1673/1986). These
dynamics characterize patterns of rhythmic coordination between
oscillators whether the coordination is intended or spontaneous.
Moreover, these coordination dynamics are evident both in the
behavior of limbmovements and in the patterns of neural activity
that accompany such movements (e.g., Schöner and Kelso, 1988).
Thus, the dynamical approach manages to parsimoniously
generalize across different systems precisely because its explana-
tory principles address the organization of behavior at the func-
tional level of the system. A system of coupled oscillators obeys
lawful coordination dynamics whether the oscillators are coupled
to one another via neural linkages (e.g., human co-actors) or via
physical vibrations (e.g., coupled metronomes). What is neces-
sary is that the system components be sufficiently coupled and be
able to freely interact. This does not imply that a system of cou-
pled oscillators comprised of human participants is cognitively
equivalent to a system of coupled metronomes, nor that all social
interactions can be understood in terms of rhythmic coordination
dynamics, but rather that both systems exhibit the same coordi-
nation dynamics because systems are subject to the same lawful
constraints and share the same functional organization.
It is also important to reiterate that the dynamical systems
approach is not solely concerned with observed macro-level
behavior, but is equally interested in uncovering the dynamic sta-
bilities of more micro-level neural activity (e.g., Tognoli et al.,
2007; Lindenberger et al., 2009; Dumas et al., 2010). Of particu-
lar interest, given the current discussion, is research investigating
neural processes involved in sensori-motor coordination (Jantzen
and Kelso, 2007; Jantzen et al., 2009; Kelso, 2012). This research
program has revealed that neural dynamics exhibit oscillatory
patterns that can be examined and understood with the principles
of coordination dynamics. For instance, Tognoli and colleagues
(2007) instructed pairs of participants to produce rhythmic fin-
ger oscillations while fitted with electroencephalogram (EEG)
recording equipment. A varying degree of spontaneous entrain-
ment emerged between participants during conditions in which
they could see one another’s movements. A spectral analysis of
the EEG data revealed a two-component peak in neural activity
within a certain frequency band (9.2–11.5Hz) that was specific to
the degree of entrainment. Whereas the first component of this
“phi complex” was associated with the degree of unsynchronized
rhythmic movements, the second was associated with synchro-
nization. Interestingly, the brain topography in the EEG data
suggested that the brain structures associated with the human
mirror neuron system might play a role in these phi dynam-
ics, highlighting the possible relationships between neural and
behavioral dynamics.
Again, the dynamical approach is not against the theoretical
notion that the activities of the central nervous system are amean-
ingful and necessary part of human behavior.What the dynamical
approach does suggest is a different conceptualization of these
neural structures. Whereas the traditional approach conceptual-
izes these structures as “mechanisms,” the dynamical approach
conceptualizes them as self-organizing synergies. That is, neural
structures and their activities are considered to be part of the syn-
ergetic relationship by which an organism sustains its functional
interactions with its environment. This claim holds that neural
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components are temporarily assembled into functional units by
task-specific constraints (Kelso, 2009). This conception of neural
activity seems to fit well with the findings suggesting that the same
neural structures are involved in several different functional rela-
tionships, rather than having one context-independent function
(i.e., neural reuse; see Anderson, 2010).
This conception offers an opportunity to situate the activities
of the nervous system within the context of constraints at the level
of the complete human behavioral system. At the most funda-
mental level, the dynamics of the natural environment provides
a rich set of constraints on behavior. For instance, the physical
sciences have revealed a set of lawful processes that govern the
motion of physical bodies (i.e., the law of gravity) and trans-
formations of energy (i.e., the laws of thermodynamics). These
lawful processes lie behind the large-scale, long-term behavioral
stabilities of all physical systems, including the body in which the
nervous system has evolved. Similarly, the specific properties of
the body (e.g., weights of limbs, joint linkages), in the context of
the properties of the environment, yield natural, intrinsic bodily
dynamics that constrain behaviors. These embodied-embedded
constraints on human behavior provide fundamental sources of
behavioral stability that are argued to underlie human cogni-
tion (e.g., van Dijk et al., 2008; Richardson et al., 2010; Schmidt
et al., 2011). Kelso (2002) has proposed that the processes of self-
organization in human behavior might also provide the critical
foundation for consciousness and agency to emerge. Similarly,
Jordan and Ghin (2006, 2007) have recently argued that self-
organization and “contextual emergence” provide a theoretically
grounded basis to understand intentionality, anticipation, and
cognition. These authors suggest that the work of the micro-scale,
componential interactions of the system (e.g., neural dynamics)
are “naturally and necessarily about” the macro-scale, functional
wholes in which they sustain themselves. Thus, these micro-scale
activities are meaningful embodiments of the behavioral context
in which they emerge. These embodiments constitute “virtual
content” (i.e., intentions and goals) when the macro-scale behav-
ioral wholes they are “about” involve prospective relationships
to the environment and other organisms (e.g., predator-prey
relations). Hence, the dynamical processes of embodiment in
embedded self-sustaining systems constitute a natural, grounded
basis for phenomenal meaning (i.e., contextual aboutness) that
might not only underlie physical co-action or social movement
coordination, but also more uniquely human, social behaviors
(e.g., symbolic communication; see Streeck and Jordan, 2009).
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
So, what then is the role of the central nervous system in the
organization of human social interactions? We do not proclaim
to have the definitive answer to this question. Current trends in
neuroscience suggest that certain neural networks underlie the
social-cognitive abilities necessary to sustain social interactions.
Ample evidence from both neurological and behavioral studies
provides compelling reasons to accept that the activities of these
neural structures are critical to a full account of social interac-
tion. Accounts of social interactions relying exclusively on these
neurological mechanisms, however, are likely to encounter the
same philosophical issues inherent in representational approaches
in general. Although efficient causal mechanisms can certainly
accomplish their proposed computational processing, the ques-
tion remains of how these computations ever give rise to the
meaningful experiences we refer to when we claim to “know” the
intention of our co-actors or are able to “predict” their future
behavior.
Although these philosophical issues are not easily overcome,
we propose that the explanatory concepts and descriptive tools of
dynamical systems theory can serve as a complementary frame-
work to the recent advances made in social-cognitive neuro-
science. Rather than insist that either framework has superior
explanatory access to the processes underlying human social
interaction, we propose that the representational and dynamical
approaches form a complementary pair (Pattee, 1978, 1982; Kelso
and Enstrøm, 2006). As such, the contribution of the dynamical
approach is to provide the set of concepts by which the neural
“mechanisms” involved in the organization of social behavior can
be understood as emergent mechanisms; embodied reflections of
lawful dynamics.
Central toaccomplishing this contribution is, of course,provid-
ing empirical evidence of how such concepts can frame a general
theory of social interactions. Although the previous investigations
of periodic behaviors has provided evidence that the dynamical
approach is applicable to the spatio-temporal organization of
social actions, this alone does not constitute the foundation for a
general theory. As Sebanz and Knoblich (2009) rightly insist, the
dynamical approach must be empirically extended to accounts of
non-periodic actions. To this end, future research should focus
on investigating the behavioral dynamics of a broader range of
everyday social activities, including more discrete, goal-directed,
and complementary joint actions, and the time-evolving neural
activity that takes place during such interaction.
Thankfully such research endeavors have already begun. For
instance, several researchers have started to investigate the behav-
ioral dynamics and coordination that occurs between individuals
who are dancing together, telling jokes, or simply conversing (e.g.,
Boker and Rotondo, 2002; Shockley et al., 2003; Dale and Spivey,
2006; Sandamirskaya and Schöner, 2006; Schmidt et al., 2011).
Others have begun to investigate coordination patterns in more
goal-directed interaction tasks (e.g., Mottet et al., 2001; Newman-
Norland et al., 2008), including how individual actors might
couple in ways that give rise to functional roles that collectively
stabilize group behavior (e.g., Goldstone et al., 2008; Richardson
et al., 2011).
What is still needed, however, are specific investigations of
what neural synergies emerge during these kinds of behaviors and
how the time-evolving behavior of these neural synergies is spe-
cific to the physical dynamics and constraints of a joint action
task. We are excited at the prospect of what discoveries such stud-
ies may hold for understanding the role of the brain in shaping
social behavior and cognition. We foresee that future research on
the dynamics of social interaction will maintain that the neuro-
logical mechanisms promoted by social neuroscience are inher-
ently and necessarily meaningful when appropriately situated and
grounded in the myriad of natural constraints that shape behav-
ioral order. In short, we believe that social neuroscience should be
directed toward investigating how neural structures are functional
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embodiments of the self-organizing dynamics in which they have
evolved and in which they exist, and how the activity of the
nervous system is part of the synergistic animal-environment sys-
tems that sustain and support complex human behavior. This can
be achieved by exploring the manner in which neural processes
are entailed and modified by the dynamics of real-time social
action and support the physical and informational couplings that
self-organize perception, action, and cognition.
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